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Abstract
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol is a de
facto standard of secure client-server communication on
the Internet. Its security can be diminished by a vari-
ety of attacks that leverage on weaknesses in its design
and implementations. An example of a major weakness
is the public-key infrastructure (PKI) that TLS deploys,
which is a weakest-link system and introduces hundreds
of links (i.e., trusted entities). Consequently, an adver-
sary compromising a single trusted entity can imperson-
ate any website.
Notary systems, based on multi-path probing, were
early and promising proposals to detect and prevent such
attacks. Unfortunately, despite their benefits, they are
not widely deployed, mainly due to their long-standing
unresolved problems. In this paper, we present Per-
sistent and Accountable Domain Validation (PADVA),
which is a next-generation TLS notary service. PADVA
combines the advantages of previous proposals, enhanc-
ing them, introducing novel mechanisms, and leverag-
ing a blockchain platform which provides new features.
PADVA keeps notaries auditable and accountable, intro-
duces service-level agreements and mechanisms to en-
force them, relaxes availability requirements for notaries,
and works with the legacy TLS ecosystem. We imple-
mented and evaluated PADVA, and our experiments in-
dicate its efficiency and deployability.
1 Introduction
The security of TLS connections strongly depends on the
authenticity of public keys. In the TLS PKI [12], a pub-
lic key is authenticated by a trusted certification authority
(CA), whose task is to verify a binding between an iden-
tity and a public key, and subsequently, issue a certificate
asserting it. Unfortunately, this process does not provide
a high-security level for various reasons. The identity
verification is usually conducted over the Internet basing
on the trust on first use model [6], moreover, it is a one-
time operation (i.e., per certificate issuance). Therefore,
an adversary able to impersonate a domain, even for just
a moment, can obtain a valid certificate for this domain.
Besides that, the TLS PKI is a weakest-link system, and
compromising a single CA (out of hundreds of trusted
CAs [35]) can result in a successful impersonation at-
tack, as observed in the past [1, 11].
One of the first approaches to mitigate such attacks
were notary systems [26,45]. The main idea behind them
is to introduce the new trusted party, known as a notary.
The notary provides a TLS client with its view of the
contacted server’s public key. Hence, the client gets bet-
ter guarantees that the key is legitimate. Notary systems
are based on multi-path probing and assume that attacks
are usually short-lived or/and scoped to a network topol-
ogy fragment. Although they inspired the research com-
munity, they did not receive enough traction to be widely
deployed. Notary systems are often critiqued as they in-
troduce privacy issues (i.e., TLS clients reveal servers
they want to contact to), increase latency of TLS con-
nections (a response from a notary has to be delivered),
and are required to provide high availability (otherwise
client queries will timeout or introduce significant la-
tency) [5, 20, 31]. Furthermore, notaries are trusted, not
transparent, and difficult to audit.
In this paper, we present Persistent and Accountable
Domain Validation (PADVA), a next-generation TLS no-
tary service that solves multiple problems of the pre-
viously proposed notary systems. In PADVA, notaries
persistently validate public keys of domains in an au-
ditable and accountable manner. By leveraging proper-
ties of a blockchain platform, PADVA achieves trans-
parency, provides a framework for service-level agree-
ment (SLA) enforcement, and relaxes availability re-
quirements. PADVA is compatible with legacy TLS in-
frastructure, and can be deployed today, even with TLS
servers with desynchronized clocks. Our implementa-
tion and evaluation indicate efficiency and deployability
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of our system. With PADVA, the key validation becomes
a service (instead of a one-time operation) with imple-
mentable SLAs, and with auditable and accountable no-
taries.
2 Background and Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce basic information on the
TLS protocol, we define the problem, and introduce sys-
tem and adversary models.
2.1 Transport Layer Security
The TLS protocol is designed to provide secure commu-
nication in the client-server model. It is widely deployed
and its most prominent use is to secure the HTTP pro-
tocol (HTTPS). In such a setting, only a (web) server is
authenticated and the authentication is based on X.509
certificates [12]. The current and the recommended ver-
sion of the protocol is TLS 1.2 [13], however, older ver-
sions, like 1.0 and 1.1, are still widely supported.1
2.1.1 Handshake
The first phase of the TLS connection establishment is
the TLS handshake protocol. Its goal is to securely ne-
gotiate a shared symmetric key between communicat-
ing parties. There are many variants of the TLS hand-
shake and we present the version based on the ephemeral
Diffie-Hellman (DH) protocol [7]. This version is rec-
ommended due to its security benefits (i.e., it provides
forward secrecy), and is used by default by modern TLS
clients [41] and servers.2
The handshake is presented in Figure 1. It starts with
exchanging the ClientHello and ServerHello mes-
sages, where the client and server indicate their sup-
ported cryptographic primitives, their random nonces,
and other connection parameters. Next, the server sends
its certificate and the ServerKeyExchange message.
This message contains DH parameters required to con-
duct an ephemeral DH key exchange and a signature that
protects these parameters. This signature is computed
using the private key corresponding to the public key of
the server’s certificate. After the ServerHello phase is
finished, the client verifies the signature and sends its
DH contribution. Next, the client and server compute
the shared secret and will then signal that the following
communication will be encrypted.
1https://www.ssllabs.com/ssl-pulse/
2https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/clients.html
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Figure 1: The TLS handshake with an ephemeral DH key
exchange.
2.1.2 Certificates
Certificates in the TLS protocol are used to verify end
entities. In most cases, like HTTPS, only the server is
authenticated (i.e., the client does not have a certificate),
and usually, the server is identified by its domain name.
Certificates are issued by a trusted CA that is obligated to
validate the ownership of a public key prior to the certifi-
cate issuance. In the current TLS ecosystem, the dom-
inant way of the validation is based on a domain name
ownership. To get a domain-validated certificate, an en-
tity has to prove to a CA that it controls the domain name
for which a certificate is requested. CAs automate this
process, and usually the validation is conducted via DNS,
HTTP, or e-mail [6].
2.2 Problem Definition
Notary systems were motivated by the weak authentica-
tion of public keys that the standard TLS PKI model pro-
vides. As described above, in most cases, CAs rely only
on a domain validation conducted over an insecure chan-
nel, moreover, they validate the given domain only once
per certificate’s lifetime (i.e., just before the certificate is
issued). Consequently, an adversary with the ability to
temporarily launch a man-in-the-middle (MitM) attack
between any CA and a domain, or temporarily control
the domain’s DNS zone, e-mail, or a web server, can get
a valid certificate for this domain. Such a certificate can
be then used to impersonate the domain to any client.
Notary systems try to improve the security of the TLS
connections, providing their views of domains’ public
keys. Notaries can periodically check domains’ public
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keys and the key continuity [15] of the observed keys
can be measured, such that notaries can inform clients
about historical views to give them better guarantees
about public keys they currently see. The effectiveness
of notary systems is based on the following assumptions:
• impersonation attacks are usually short-lived, thus
key continuity, that says for how long a public key is
being used by an entity, can be a practical measure
for estimating how a given public key is suspicious,
• multipath probing can detect various MitM attacks,
as usually attacks are limited to a fragment of the
network topology.
Unfortunately, notary systems never received main-
stream deployment, mainly due to availability, privacy,
and security issues. Below, we list the desired properties
that a successful notary system should hold. This list is
motivated by lessons learned from deployments of notary
(and other security) infrastructures.
Persistence: in contrast to today CAs, notaries should
validate public keys persistently. The validation
conducted persistently can increase security level,
as then an adversary has to have a permanent ability
to impersonate a targeted domain. With such val-
idation, it is possible to reliably implement secu-
rity metrics like key continuity. Interestingly, sim-
ilar benefits can be provided by short-lived certifi-
cates [37], however, due to the CA ecosystem ossi-
fication the attempts of introducing short-lived cer-
tificates failed.3
Auditability: in the previous proposals notaries are
trusted. Such a setting is circular as trust prob-
lems of the CA ecosystem are addressed by another
trusted parties (notaries). Some level of trust seems
to be unavoidable as clients that contact a notary
have to rely on the notary’s view. However, where
possible notaries should be auditable, such that they
can be kept accountable for their actions. Ideally,
operations of notaries are authentic and transparent,
such that anyone can audit them.
Privacy: notary systems are designed in the interactive
client-server model, where clients wishing to check
notary’s view have to contact notary server(s). That
design gives a notary infrastructure ability to learn
which websites are visited by which clients. This is
unacceptable and a successful notary system should
be privacy-preserving.
Availability: another consequence of the interactive
model is an increased latency of TLS connection
establishments and strong availability requirements,
as information from a notary has to be reliably sent
to clients. Unfortunately, maintaining high avail-
3https://cabforum.org/2015/11/11/
ballot-153-short-lived-certificates/
ability level for front-end servers is a challenging
task, and currently, existing security infrastructures
(like PKI revocation infrastructures [12] or certifi-
cates logs [22]) have major problems with achieving
it [17, 18, 23, 38].
Backward compatibility: a notary should be compat-
ible with the legacy TLS ecosystem (or at least a
large its portion), such that it can provide benefits
immediately when deployed. The TLS PKI ecosys-
tem has many stakeholders like CAs, browser ven-
dors, and influential websites. As we witnessed
in the past, it is challenging to deploy a new se-
curity enhancement without reaching a broad con-
sensus [29]. Ideally, a notary system should be or-
thogonal to the deployed TLS protocol and the TLS
PKI, such that it can be deployed almost immedi-
ately without requiring flag days, servers’ upgrades,
and protocol changes.
2.3 Assumptions
2.3.1 System Model
PADVA introduces the following parties:
Server: provides a service via the TLS protocol (e.g.,
HTTPS). We assume that services (and servers con-
sequently) are identified by domain names.
Notary: is an entity that offers a PADVA service. No-
taries are obligated to monitor servers by validating
their public keys.
Requester: is an entity interested in monitoring server’s
public key(s). It can be a server’s operator or any
other entity. A requester orders the PADVA service
from a notary.
We assume that notaries and requesters have an ac-
cess to a blockchain platform with smart contracts en-
abled. For simple description, we also assume that the
platform has its cryptocurrency that is used by notaries
and requesters, however money transfers in PADVA can
be realized with a fiat currency if desired (e.g., due to
cryptocurrency volatility). For instance, our scheme can
be combined with systems like Ethereum4 or Hyper-
Ledger5. We describe PADVA using an open blockchain
platform, however, PADVA can be adjusted to a pri-
vate platform if needed. We do not require that clocks
of servers are synchronized. However, we assume that
the requester and notary can agree on at least one refer-
ence time source (in particular this can be the monitored
server).
4https://www.ethereum.org/
5https://hyperledger.org/
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2.3.2 Adversary Model
With regards to MitM attacks, we use the adversary
model introduced by previous notary systems [26, 45].
Namely, we assume that impersonation attacks have lim-
ited duration, or are limited to only a fragment of the
network topology. Otherwise, a long-lived attack that
encompasses the entire topology would be difficult to
detect by any notary system (as the detection bases on
finding views’ inconsistency).
We assume that a notary can misbehave by report-
ing an invalid view or censoring requester audit queries.
However, in such a case the misbehavior should be de-
tected and the notary should be punished.
We assume that the adversary cannot undermine se-
curity properties of the underlying blockchain platform,
and we assume that the adversary cannot compromise the
security of the used cryptographic primitives.
3 PADVA Overview
The main observation behind the PADVA’s design is that
although benefits of notary systems are attractive, their
deployment is marginal due to deployment, operational,
and design issues. Hence, first we introduce the core de-
sign decisions that enable to build a more powerful no-
tary system, and then we outline an overview of PADVA.
3.1 Design Choices
Our first design choice is to position a persistent and
auditable key validation as the main task of notaries.
In PADVA, notaries constantly validate public keys of
domains and measure key continuity. That allows imple-
menting effective protection and detection mechanisms
in an ecosystem with predominant domain-validated cer-
tificates. In such a setting, there are some similarities
between notaries and CAs conducting domain validation
except:
• notaries validate public key of domains perma-
nently (in short intervals), and
• notaries are not authorized to issue certificates.
Besides that, PADVA aims to provide auditable and ac-
countable key validation. Notaries in our system are not
trusted parties, as they have to get a proof that given do-
main used given key at given time. These proofs, called
validation results, and other actions of notaries are au-
ditable what enables requesters to verify them.
PADVA notaries offer key validation as a service. In
short, we argue that notaries should serve a demand-
driven service, ideally with payment and SLA frame-
works available. There are many challenges associated
with designing and implementing key validation as a ser-
vice. However, offering key validation as a service would
incentivize notaries to maintain a robust infrastructure.
On the other hands, implementable SLAs would secure
requesters from notaries violating mutual agreements.
To be deployed, a notary system must be compatible
with the legacy ecosystem. It means that we should not
propose any modifications to the TLS protocol nor need
any server-side changes (including even small changes
like time synchronization). The system should be de-
ployable within the current environment.
This choice is motivated by the history of TLS secu-
rity enhancements deployment. Many security proposals
failed due to server-side changes required or due to low
adoption rate (as to work effectively they require large-
scale adoption) [10, 29]. For instance, even such a criti-
cal functionality like certificate revocation cannot be suc-
cessfully deployed [24].
We use a blockchain as a publishing and contract
enforcement platform.6Although the blockchain tech-
nology is still in its infancy, its inherent properties,
like transparency, consistency, and censorship resistance,
make it a promising underlying technology for a notary
system.
Firstly, PADVA notaries use the blockchain as a pub-
lishing platform to increase transparency (auditability),
availability, and to preserve users’ privacy. In contrast to
interactive client-server architectures, where clients have
to contact a notary to get its view, in PADVA notaries
publish they validation outcomes in the blockchain, thus
anyone can read it passively.
Secondly, smart contracts built upon the blockchain
platform allow us to automate the notary system by:
• introducing automated payments, that would incen-
tivize notaries to keep a robust infrastructure, and
• implementing an SLA enforcement mechanism, to
provide guarantees to the requesters (in the case of
a misbehaving or unavailable notary).
We decouple interface between notaries and re-
questers into a direct and indirect interface. Requesters
and notaries follow the client-server model for the direct
interface, which is used mainly for auditing notaries (i.e.,
querying audit proofs). However, for critical operations,
this model is enriched by the blockchain-based indirect
interface, where smart contracts act as a proxy to pass
queries and as an oracle to resolve potential disputes.
Operations over the indirect interface are implemented
as blockchain transactions thus are transparent, account-
able, and cannot be censored. This interface is intended
only for critical operations like an agreement creation or
an SLA execution (e.g., when a notary is unresponsive
6Although our system does not necessarily require the blockchain
data structure and can be instantiated with most distributed ledger sys-
tems, we use the blockchain term as the most of the existing distributed
ledgers deploy the blockchain data structure or similar.
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or censors queries sent via the direct interface), so in-
teractions with blockchain are involved only when it is
necessary.
3.2 High-level Overview
A high-level overview of PADVA is presented in Fig-
ure 2. The central point of our design is a blockchain
platform that implements two main functionalities (the
indirect interface between notaries and requesters, and
publishing of validation results). The indirect interface
is used to initialize a PADVA service and to enforce an
SLA between the notary and requester, while the direct
interface is used mainly for auditing the notary.
We assume that a requester knows (e.g., through a
website) a notary, location (address) of its smart con-
tracts, the service fee, and the guaranteed SLA. Then,
the protocol is executed as follows.
1. In the first step, a requester requests the notary ser-
vice by sending a transaction (to the notary’s con-
tract) that contains a fee for the service and specifies
request details like a domain name to be validated
and its legitimate public keys.
2. The notary notices the request and configures the
service to serve the request. Additionally, the notary
deposits money that will be used to ensure its SLA.
Alternatively, the notary can refuse the request for
any reason, like a misconfigured or inaccessible tar-
get server.
3. Every validation period T , the notary contacts the
server and obtains an authenticated and fresh infor-
mation about the server’s public key. Depending on
an outcome of this validation the notary is obligated
to publish in the blockchain any change of the vali-
dation state. Hence, the validation state can be read
by any blockchain user.
4. If there is no state change, the notary does not pub-
lish anything, which implies that the previous state
is still valid. Therefore, we optimize for the com-
mon case (i.e., no state change per T ).
5. In order to ensure that the validation state in the
blockchain is correct, at any time the requester can
query the notary through the direct interface to pro-
vide validation result(s). If the notary cannot pro-
vide the requested result(s) (e.g., the notary is un-
available or refusing the query), then the requester
can use the indirect interface to send the same query
over the blockchain. If within a predefined time pe-
riod the notary does not respond using the indirect
interface, then the SLA is executed (i.e., the deposit
is sent to the requester and the service contract ter-
minates).
The service in PADVA can be ordered by anyone, al-
though we predict that usually server operators have in-
Notary
Requester
Server User
Blockchain Platform
Validation 
State
Direct Interface
Service 
Init SLA
Indirect 
Interface
Indirect 
Interface
ReportValidation
Read
Figure 2: A high-level overview of PADVA.
centives to order it. We do not mandate how validation
results are used and interpreted, but some potential de-
ployment models can be: a) a public service accessible
to all TLS clients, b) a monitoring tool used only by do-
main operators, c) results can be aggregated and deliv-
ered to TLS clients [21], or d) or can be part of a more
powerful system [16].
4 PADVA Details
In this section, we present details of PADVA. We start
with service setup, then we present how notaries vali-
date public keys and report outcomes of these valida-
tions. Next, we show how to monitor TLS servers that
do not have clocks synchronized, and finally, we present
auditing and SLA mechanisms provided.
4.1 Service Setup
To order a notary service, a requester sends a transaction
to the notary’s contract specifying the following parame-
ters (see request() in Figure 3).
Domain name whose public key(s) will be validated.
Whitelist of public key(s) that allows the requester to
specify which public keys are legitimate. If the no-
tary will observe a listed key, then it is treated as a
normal event and no warning notification is issued.
Keys in the list are identified by their hashes. If
the whitelist is empty, then any new public key ob-
served will be reported.
Fee that is paid to the notary for the service. Fees are
predefined by notaries and determine the service du-
ration and the SLA provided.
Reference time source specifies a time source server
that will be used as a reference. This parameter is
optional and used if the monitored server does not
return the correct time. If the time source is not pro-
vided, then the monitored server act as the reference
time source.
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Beside parameters given by requesters, each service
has associated conditions of the SLA it offers. These
conditions specify:
• how frequent the notary validates the public key of
the server (the validation interval T ), and
• the availability level provided and a penalty when
the level is not met.
The notary observes all transactions sent to its
contract and processes incoming requests (calling
handle request() from Figure 3). The notary checks
whether the requester’s input is correct (checking the do-
main name, the whitelist, the fee, and the time source if
specified) and accepts the request (accept() from Fig-
ure 3) by creating a new service and transferring deposit
that will be used for ensuring the SLA.
The notary may refuse the request if the given param-
eters are incorrect, the server is unresponsive or miscon-
figured, or for any other reason. In such a case, the re-
quester gets the fee back by calling the timeout req()
function that triggers the timeout() method (see Fig-
ure 3).
4.2 Public-Key Validation and Reporting
PADVA is designed to be compatible with the current
TLS infrastructure. However, there are a few challenges
associated with that. Since we want to keep notaries au-
ditable and accountable, a notary to prove that it is val-
idating a domain’s public key has to periodically obtain
an authentic and fresh information that the correspond-
ing private key is being used by the domain. But the TLS
protocol was not designed to provide such an informa-
tion.
To overcome this issue, we exploit a message of
the TLS handshake protocol (see subsubsection 2.1.1).
Namely, the ServerKeyExchange message is signed
with a server’s private key, and is sent by a server when
the key exchange protocol negotiated is a variant of
the DHE DSS or DHE RSA methods. These methods are
widely deployed and used [3].
The ServerKeyExchange message is introduced to
provide authentication for client-server negotiated pa-
rameters. It contains a server’s signature over the
signed params structure, which consists of client and
server random values and server DH parameters (see Fig-
ure 4).
This is the only message signed by a server during
the TLS handshake, hence only that can be obtained by
notaries as a non-repudiable proof that a given key was
used. However, the authenticity of the message is not
enough, as it only proves that the key was used, but does
not specify when it happened.
A message has to be fresh, as otherwise, a misbehav-
ing notary could conduct multiple handshakes at once,
# R e q u e s t e r i n i t i a t e s t h e s e r v i c e
def r e q u e s t ( c o n t r a c t , domain , keys ,
fee , t i m e s o u r c e =None )
r e q = Reques t ( domain , keys , fee ,
t i m e s o u r c e )
c o n t r a c t . r e q u e s t ( r e q )
# The main c o n t r a c t c l a s s
c l a s s N o t a r y C o n t r a c t ( ) :
# S c h e d u l e r e q u e s t
def r e q u e s t ( s e l f , r e q ) :
s e l f . a d d r e q u e s t ( r e q )
s e l f . d e p o s i t ( r e q . f e e )
# Ac ce p t r e q u e s t
def a c c e p t ( s e l f , r e q ) :
a s s e r t r e q in s e l f . r e q u e s t s
a s s e r t s e n d e r == s e l f . owner
s e l f . d e p o s i t ( s e l f . SLA DEPOSIT )
s e l f . a d d s e r v i c e ( r e q )
s e l f . r e m o v e r e q u e s t ( r e q )
# Timeout pend ing r e q u e s t
def t i m e o u t ( s e l f , r e q ) :
a s s e r t r e q in s e l f . r e q u e s t s
a s s e r t s e n d e r == r e q . r e q u e s t e r
s e l f . t r a n s f e r ( r e q . r e q u e s t e r , r e q . f e e )
s e l f . r e m o v e r e q u e s t ( r e q )
. . .
# Notary a c c e p t s t h e r e q u e s t
def h a n d l e r e q u e s t ( c o n t r a c t , r e q ) :
# V a l i d a t e t h e r e q u e s t p a r a m e t e r s
# l i k e domain name , keys , e t c . . .
a s s e r t v a l i d a t e ( r e q )
c o n t r a c t . a c c e p t ( r e q )
# R e q u e s t e r t r i g g e r s r e q u e s t t i m e o u t
def t i m e o u t r e q ( c o n t r a c t , r e q ) :
c o n t r a c t . t i m e o u t ( r e q )
Figure 3: Pseudocode of the service setup operations.
digitally-signed struct {
opaque client_random[32];
opaque server_random[32];
ServerDHParams params;
} signed_params;
Figure 4: The signed params structure, which is signed
by a server during a TLS handshake.
and then use them to claim a fake event timeline. There is
no explicit timestamp in the structure, but fortunately, the
client and server random inputs are defined as presented
in Figure 5, where the gmt unix time field is the current
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struct {
uint32 gmt_unix_time;
opaque random_bytes[28];
} Random;
Figure 5: The Random structure, that specifies server’s
and client’s random inputs.
GMT Unix 32-bit timestamp, and the random bytes is
28-byte long random value, generated by a secure ran-
dom number generator.
Using these messages, the notary can periodically ob-
tain a signed statement from the server which implies
that a given key was used at given point in time. To
do so, the notary at least every T conducts a new TLS
handshake with the server and saves as a validation result
the server’s certificate, signed values (including server’s
timestamp), and the signature. These messages are sent
during a TLS handshake in plaintext, and they allow to
prove to anyone that the corresponding private key was
used at the time specified in the gmt unix time field of
the Random structure sent by the server. For each such a
public-key validation a notary assigns a unique number
(counter) called a validation id (vid). Validation results,
accompanied by their corresponding vids, are stored by
notaries for audits.
A notary has to inform about results of the valida-
tion process. A naive approach would be to just to pub-
lish a validation result every T in the blockchain. How-
ever, that would cause a significant overhead incurred by
publishing the result of every validation. To minimize
the interactions between notaries and the blockchain
(i.e., to not flood the blockchain with the protocol mes-
sages), notaries keep all validation results but report in
the blockchain only changes of the validation state. More
specifically, the validation state is encoded using the fol-
lowing messages:
OK: successful validation, i.e., the observed public key is
whitelisted.
Error: unsuccessful validation that can be caused by
various reasons. The following error types are spec-
ified:
NewKey: a new public key, outside the whitelist,
was observed. This event can denote a mis-
configuration or an impersonation attack. The
notary that changes the state to NewKey pub-
lishes also the hash of the newly observed key.
Time: timestamp signed by the monitored server
(or the time source, if specified — see the next
section) in the ServerKeyExchange message
is incorrect (i.e., deviating from the notary
time).
Connect: denotes availability issues, when the no-
# The main c o n t r a c t c l a s s
c l a s s N o t a r y C o n t r a c t ( ) :
. . .
# Change s t a t e
def s t a t e ( s e l f , s rv , new ) :
a s s e r t s r v in s e l f . s e r v i c e s
a s s e r t s e n d e r == s e l f . owner
i f ( new . v i d > s r v . s t a t e . v i d and
new . s t a t u s != s r v . s t a t e . s t a t u s ) :
s r v . s t a t e = new
. . .
# Notary changes t h e v a l i d a t i o n s t a t e
def c h a n g e s t a t e ( c o n t r a c t , s t a t u s , v i d ) :
new = S t a t e ( s t a t u s , v i d )
c o n t r a c t . s t a t e ( s rv , new )
Figure 6: Pseudocode of the state update procedure.
tary cannot conduct a successful TLS connec-
tion with the server. It can be caused by a net-
work outage, a server-side error, or an adver-
sary blocking the connection.
Other: other error, not specified above.
The notary submits each state update by calling
change state() that triggers the state() method of
the notary’s contract (see Figure 6). A state update is
associated with the corresponding vid, i.e., the id of the
validation when the state change happened. If there is no
state change, then no message is sent. Using this simple
approach, PADVA optimizes for the common case (i.e.,
a public key of a server changes infrequently).
Reported state changes allow drawing an event time-
line. An example of such a timeline is presented in
Figure 7. In the first validation, the notary obtains a
whitelisted public key, thus it reports the OK message
with vid equals 0. Then, the subsequent 30 validations
are also successful, thus no state change is published in
the blockchain. With the validation 31, the notary detects
time
vid: 0
803b...
vid: 1
803b...
... vid: 30
de09...
vid: 31
a632...
vid: 32
803b...
legitimate keys
0: OK 31: Err
NewKey
a632...
32: OK
Figure 7: Timeline of the validation results and the cor-
responding state changes published in the blockchain. In
the example, the public-key whitelist is set to {803b...,
de09...}.
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a public key outside the whitelist, therefore a NewKey er-
ror specifying the hash of the newly observed key is re-
ported. The last validation presented is again successful,
hence the notary changes the state back to OK.
4.3 Handshake Timestamping
So far, we present PADVA in the setting where a times-
tamp returned by the monitored server acts as the ref-
erence time. However, the TLS protocol does not re-
quire clocks to be set correctly [13], and moreover, some
implementations violate the specification and do not set
correct timestamps [27]. As presented in subsection 6.2,
about 63% of tested TLS servers do not put correct times-
tamps into their ServerHello messages.
That could limit deployment of PADVA since TLS
servers that do not return correct timestamps cannot
be reliably monitored (without server-side timestamp it
would be impossible to tell when a given validation hap-
pened). To overcome this issue, PADVA allows notaries
and requesters to agree on a reference time source (see
subsection 4.1) which will be used for timestamping TLS
handshakes. For simple description, we assume that a
time source server for any client’s input returns this in-
put timestamped and signed.
To prove that the public-key validation happened at the
given time (according to an external time source) we in-
Server Notary Time Source
r = rand()
r
r, t1,σ1
h1 = H(r, t1,σ1)
CH.random = h1
CH
SKE
h2 = H(SKE)
h2
h2, t2,σ2
Figure 8: The extended public-key validation protocol,
with the time source server involved. H() stands for a
cryptographic hash function.
troduce a protocol that the notary executes at every vali-
dation. The protocol is presented in Figure 8 and its steps
are executed as follows:
1. the notary initiates the protocol by sending a ran-
dom value r to the time source server.
2. The time source, responds with a signed message
(r, t1,σ1) which contains the random input, a times-
tamp t1 (set by the time source), and the signature
computed by the time source.
3. Next, the notary prepares the ClientHello mes-
sage CH to be sent to the monitored server. The
notary sets the random field of this message to the
hash of (r, t1,σ1), and subsequently initiates a TLS
handshake with the monitored server by sending
CH.
4. The server responds with the signed
ServerKeyExchange message SKE. Times-
tamp included in this message is incorrect (as we
assumed that the server timestamps are unreliable),
however, the client random field is the hash over
the (r, t1,σ1) message, which in turn contains the
trusted timestamp t1. Thus, it implies that SKE was
created after t1.
5. Then, the notary sends h2 = H(SKE) to be times-
tamped by the time server.
6. Finally, the time source returns a signed (h2, t2,σ2)
message, which contains the (trusted) timestamp t2
and H(SKE) in the client random field. This im-
plies, that SKE is older than (h2, t2,σ2), thus is older
than its timestamp t2.
By executing the protocol, the notary gets the evidence
that the message SKE signed by the monitored server is
older than (r, t1,σ1) and newer than (h2, t2,σ2). The no-
tary keeps all the messages of the protocol as a validation
result, that can prove that the server’s public key was val-
idated between t1 and t2.
Interestingly, any TLS server that can be monitored by
PADVA, can also act as a time source. In such a case, the
notary simply uses the random field of the ClientHello
message to submit data to be timestamped and receives
a ServerKeyExchange message that signs this data. As
presented in subsection 6.2, in such a setting an aver-
age time difference between receiving t2 and t1 was mea-
sured as 0.34s, thus such estimation is precise. More-
over, the protocol can be also easily combined PADVA
with other protocols and infrastructures (as discussed in
subsection 7.1).
4.4 Auditing and SLAs
The main task of a notary is to periodically check a mon-
itored server’s public key(s). PADVA keeps notaries au-
ditable and accountable for their actions, and to facilitate
the audit process, a notary is obligated to:
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• publish all changes of the validation state in the
blockchain (as described in subsection 4.2),
• store validation results for all monitored domains
throughout their service lifetimes.
At any time the requester can ask a notary about any
validation results.7 This is realized with the direct inter-
face, implemented as a standard client-server communi-
cation (e.g., an HTTP API), where the requester sends
a query specifying the validation id for which he would
like to obtain the result. The notary has to return the rel-
evant validation result, such that the requester can com-
pare it with the state encoded in the blockchain.
In the case of an inconsistency detected, the requester
can publicly announce the validation id that contradicts
the state encoded in the blockchain, as it is evidence that
the notary misbehaved. For instance, it can be a vali-
dation result where the validated key is not whitelisted,
while at the same time the state in the blockchain was not
updated (e.g., when any validation between vid 1 and 30
was for a non-whitelisted key — see Figure 7).
One challenge with the direct interface (and any client-
server service) is that the notary can be unavailable or
censor queries while the requester cannot prevent or
prove that fact. In our context, a notary can have some
reasons to not return some validation results. For in-
stance, the notary is unavailable, or was unavailable at
some validation period(s), misbehaved, or made a mis-
take and tries to hide that. PADVA provides a frame-
work to keep notaries accountable and responsible for
such cases. Namely, besides the standard client-server
direct interface, the blockchain-based indirect interface
is introduced.
If the requester notices that the notary is unavailable
(or was unavailable at a given time interval) or cen-
sors queries, the requester can query the notary over the
blockchain. In order to do so, the requester calls the
query() function that triggers the sla query of the no-
tary’s contract (see Figure 9). When the transaction with
the query is added to the blockchain it is managed by
a smart contract and the notary is obligated to submit a
response to the blockchain.
If the notary does not return any result until the dead-
line specified in the SLA then the smart contract will ex-
ecute the SLA, sending the deposit to the requester. To
trigger it, the requester calls the contract’s sla claim()
method with the unresponded query specified. It is also
visible to anyone that the notary did not respond to the
query. Alternatively, when the notary returns a response
(calling the response() function that triggers the con-
tract’s sla response()), the SLA is not executed, as
the notary proved its availability, and the response can
7In fact, all validation results can be publicly published by notaries,
such that everyone can audit it.
# R e q u e s t e r ’ s query
def que ry ( c o n t r a c t , s rv , v i d ) :
q = Query ( s rv , v i d )
c o n t r a c t . s l a q u e r y ( q )
# The main c o n t r a c t c l a s s
c l a s s N o t a r y C o n t r a c t ( ) :
. . .
# P u b l i s h r e q u e s t e r ’ s query
def s l a q u e r y ( s e l f , q ) :
a s s e r t q . s r v in s e l f . s e r v i c e s
a s s e r t s e n d e r == q . s r v . r e q u e s t e r
q . t ime = t ime ( )
s e l f . a d d q u e r y ( q )
# P u b l i s h n o t a r y ’ s r e s p o n s e
def s l a r e s p o n s e ( s e l f , q , r e s p ) :
a s s e r t q in s e l f . q u e r i e s
a s s e r t q . s r v in s e l f . s e r v i c e s
a s s e r t s e n d e r == s e l f . owner :
s e l f . a d d r e s p o n s e ( r e s p )
i f t ime ( ) − q . t ime <= s e l f . SLA TOUT :
s e l f . r emove query ( q )
# E x e c u t e SLA
def s l a c l a i m ( s e l f , q ) :
a s s e r t q in s e l f . q u e r i e s
a s s e r t q . s r v in s e l f . s e r v i c e s
a s s e r t s e n d e r == q . s r v . r e q u e s t e r
i f t ime ( ) − q . t ime > s e l f . SLA TOUT :
s e l f . t r a n s f e r ( q . s r v . r e q u e s t e r ,
s e l f . SLA DEPOSIT )
s e l f . r emove query ( q )
s e l f . r e m o v e s e r v i c e ( q . s r v )
# Notary ’ s r e s p o n s e
def r e s p o n s e ( c o n t r a c t , q , msg ) :
r e s p = Response ( q , msg )
c o n t r a c t . s l a r e s p o n s e ( s rv , q , r e s p )
Figure 9: Pseudocode of the SLA operations.
be processed by the requester (see details in section 5).
Also, in that case, the response is visible to everyone.
Thanks to dividing interactions into the two interfaces
(the standard client-server and the blockchain-based one)
the regular audit operations are conducted efficiently
without involving blockchain, while the blockchain in-
terface is used only when necessary.
5 Security Analysis
MitM attacks The main goal of notary systems is to
detect and prevent MitM attacks through multipath prob-
ing. PADVA follows this strategy, except the public key
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validation is positioned as a service, where notaries con-
stantly validate public keys and draw event timelines in
the blockchain. These timelines are essential for measur-
ing key continuity and detecting anomalies.
We do not mandate PADVA to be deployed in a spe-
cific way. Service can be requested by domain owners
and used only by themselves. Alternatively, it can be run
as a public service accessible for everyone or can be used
as a data feed for other systems [16,21]. We also empha-
size that PADVA is orthogonal to the TLS PKI. A re-
quester can whitelist any public keys believed or known
to be legitimate.
In all these cases, PADVA can provide an effective
protection against MiTM attacks as long as an attack is
short-lived or is limited only to a fragment of the net-
work topology. In the former case, the attack is seen as
an anomaly (i.e., a new observed public key outside the
whitelisted set), thus it is suspicious. In the latter case,
the attack is identified as an inconsistency between the
notary and the TLS client views. In this context, the pre-
vious systems provide similar properties, however, the
advantage of PADVA is that it provides more reliable and
auditable event timelines.
Misbehaving Notary PADVA keeps notaries account-
able, and if an adversary impersonates the domain
throughout the validation interval, then the notary can-
not make a false statement undetected that it has not
happened. More specifically, if the notary contacts the
monitored server and notices a public key that is not
whitelisted by the requester, then either a) the notary an-
nounces the state change making it visible, or b) it does
not report the state change, hiding this fact.
In the latter case, the notary takes a risk, as the re-
quester conducting an audit will notice that either the
state is incorrect (as one or more validation results are
contradicting it), or the validation result(s) are missing.
(We emphasize that the notary cannot produce a valida-
tion result on behalf of the monitored server, as the pri-
vate key corresponding to a whitelisted key is required.)
If some validation results are contradicting the published
state, the requester has evidence of the notary misbehav-
ing. However, if validation results are missing/censored,
the requester can query the notary via the indirect inter-
face. The notary is obligated to response, so either it
responds with an incorrect data, or it refuses to respond,
losing the SLA deposit and showing its unavailability to
everyone.
(D)DoS Resilience Availability is one of the major is-
sues of the previous notary systems. They were designed
in the client-server architecture, where a client wishing to
learn a validation state has to contact a notary server and
wait for its response. Client queries are expected to be
handled immediately 24/7, and due to that availability of
notary servers is crucial. Unfortunately, such a setup can
be easily attacked with a botnet targeting notary front-
end servers, practically stopping their operations.
PADVA provides a more flexible architecture, by plac-
ing a blockchain as a publishing medium, while still ex-
posing a client-server interface for heavyweight opera-
tions. An adversary with a botnet can still attack notary
front-end servers blocking their direct interfaces, how-
ever, it is much more difficult to stop the notary’s op-
eration. The notary can still use any back-end server
(unknown to the adversary) to conduct public-key val-
idations, and report the corresponding state changes (if
any) in the blockchain, such that it is available to every-
one who reads the blockchain. Namely, PADVA changes
availability requirements from “a notary needs to be
up all the time” to “a notary has to have at least one
back-end up once per the validation period T”. More-
over, to avoid enumeration back-ends can be in differ-
ent locations, with dynamic IPs, using network tunnels
or anonymity infrastructures. To completely block no-
tary operations, the adversary has to either block the
underlying peer-to-peer blockchain network or censor
blockchain transactions.
Privacy PADVA provides privacy benefits over the
previous schemes, as the validation state history can be
read from the blockchain, without contacting any third
party. In particular, no notary infrastructure is contacted
by clients.
6 Implementation and Evaluation
To prove deployability and efficiency of PADVA we im-
plemented it and then evaluated in a real-world scenario.
In this section, we report our implementation and the ob-
tained evaluation results.
6.1 Implementation
The notary’s internal architecture is presented in Fig-
ure 10 and it consists of the following elements:
Monitoring module periodically conducts TLS hand-
shakes with monitored domains. This module col-
lects cryptographic proofs and supports the times-
tamping protocol (as described in subsection 4.3).
Results gathered by the monitoring module are re-
ported to the database module.
Database module stores all necessary state and data to
run a notary service (i.e., active and inactive ser-
vices, results of all validations, pending requests,
...).
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Reporting module observes state of validations and re-
ports validation state changes into the blockchain
(using the blockchain API).
Direct interface is an HTTP API used to serve valida-
tion results to requesters. The direct interface can be
publicly accessible to provide this data to any party
that would like to audit the notary.
Indirect interface uses the blockchain API to handle
service initialization and SLA requests.
Monitoring 
Module
Direct 
Interface
Indirect 
Interface
Database 
Module
Reporting 
Module
TLS 
Comm.
HTTP 
API
Blockchain API
Read/Write 
Blockchain 
Transactions
Figure 10: The internal architecture of a PADVA notary.
We implemented most of the modules in Python. The
monitoring module was implemented with the Scapy and
Scapy-SSL-TLS libraries. In our implementation TLS
handshakes are not finished, instead, a notary sends a TCP
RST packet whenever a ServerHelloDone message is
received (see Figure 1). With this modification, our im-
plementation saves one round-trip time and is server-
friendly (as after receiving a TCP RST the server removes
the associated connection state).
We chose Ethereum as the blockchain platform, and
the smart contract part of PADVA was implemented us-
ing the Viper language8. The blockchain API was imple-
mented with Go’s9 and Python’s10 Ethereum implemen-
tations.
6.2 Evaluation
First, we investigated what is the fraction of TLS servers
can be monitored by PADVA. To this end, we scanned
15 000 domains from the Alexa top list11 and checked
how many of them deploy TLS on the HTTPS port (i.e.,
443). If a domain does not deploy TLS we also try to
8https://github.com/ethereum/viper
9https://geth.ethereum.org/
10https://github.com/ethereum/pyethereum
11http://s3.amazonaws.com/alexa-static/top-1m.csv.
zip
∆ (s) 0-1 2-5 6-60 61-300 >300
# of 3 061 420 130 82 5 823
servers 32.17% 4.41% 1.37% 0.86% 61.19%
Table 1: The distribution of timestamps returned by the
TLS servers. ∆ is defined as abs(tl − ts), where tl is the
current local time, and ts is a server’s timestamp.
prepend it with the “www.” prefix. Then, for the deploy-
ing domains, we checked how many of them return cor-
rect timestamps in the ClientHello message (prior to
this test we synchronized our clock with time.google.
com). The results are presented in Table 1. As presented,
about 37% of the TLS servers investigated return precise
timestamps (i.e., deviating from the correct time up to
one second). These servers can be monitored by PADVA
notaries directly (without involving a time source) or can
act as time sources for servers that return incorrect times-
tamps.
Next, we conducted a series of experiments to evaluate
our implementation of PADVA in a realistic scenario. We
deployed a notary server using Linux Ubuntu 16.04 (64
bit) equipped with Intel i7-6600U CPU @ 2.60GHz and
8GB of RAM. From an academic network in Asia, we
conducted 100 public-key validations selecting a random
supported TLS server (the single-server case) each time,
and another 100 public-key validations where for each
validation we selected a random supported TLS server
and another supported TLS server acting as a time source
(the timestamp case). We reported the obtained results in
Table 2, specifying minimum, maximum, average, and
median value for every measurement.
For both, the single-server and timestamp case, we re-
port time required to conduct a validation (tsing and tts re-
spectively), as well as transmission overhead incurred in
the validation (ssing and sts respectively). The validation
time is mainly determined by network latency. (We em-
phasize, that in our implementation only half TLS hand-
shakes are conducted, minimizing this latency.) For the
single-server case, it ranges between 0.04-0.31s with an
average value of 0.16s. For the same case, the number of
bytes transmitted is between 1.3-6.9KB, with an average
Min Max Avg. Med.
tsing (s) 0.04 0.31 0.16 0.15
tts (s) 0.19 0.73 0.50 0.50
ssing (B) 1 313 6 865 4 369 4 483
sts (B) 6 031 17 973 13 190 13 445
t2− t1 (s) 0.16 0.48 0.34 0.34
scert (B) 806 6 071 3 815 3 976
Table 2: The obtained performance results.
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around 4.5KB. The timestamp case, which requires three
TLS handshakes, needs between 0.19s to 0.73s with an
average value of half a second, and to transmit between
6-17KB with an average of about 13.5KB.
Next, we investigated how precise is the variant of the
public-key validation with time source server involved.
To this end, we measured the time difference between re-
ceiving the timestamps t1 and t2 from a time server (see
Figure 8). This measurement illustrates how much time it
takes to timestamp a TLS handshake (i.e., what overhead
is introduced by running the protocol from Figure 8).
The results obtained by our measurements are presented
in the table. As we can see, the overhead introduced by
deploying the timestamping protocol is around 0.20s on
average, what should be marginal when compared with a
realistic validation period T (see subsection 7.3).
PADVA notaries have to store exchanged TLS mes-
sages as validation results. However, when stored
naively this storage overhead may be significant. On av-
erage, a single validation takes 4 483B, thus a storage re-
quired for yearly validations of one server, with T equals
one hour, would be around 39.27MB. However, valida-
tion results are usually highly redundant, as their size is
dominated by certificates sent from servers to notaries
(see Figure 1). Since certificates are usually the same,
there is no need to store them all. As an average certifi-
cate chain’s size scert was measured as 3 976B, the same
yearly validation results without storing redundant cer-
tificates would require 4.44MB (almost 9 times less).
7 Discussion
7.1 Time Sources
We presented PADVA such that it deploys TLS servers as
external time sources (see subsection 4.3). However, our
scheme can be easily combined with other protocols and
infrastructure that provide authentic and reliable times-
tamps.
One, such an infrastructure is the time-stamp protocol
(TSP) [2], a document timestamping protocol that relies
on the X.509 PKI. In TSP, a client submits a hash of data
to a timestamp authority which in turn timestamps and
signs this data. The signed message is returned to the
client, so the client can prove to everyone when the data
was timestamped by the authority. This model is almost
the same as the model presented in subsection 4.3 (see
Figure 8). Thus, a TSP server can be used as an external
time source in PADVA.
Another example is time synchronization infrastruc-
tures. Usually, secure time synchronization protocols use
random client inputs to prevent replay attacks. Such an
input is timestamped and signed by a time synchroniza-
tion server, thus it can be used analogically as presented
in Figure 8. One instantiation of this approach could be
a novel time synchronization protocol Roughtime pro-
posed by Google.12
7.2 TLS 1.3
As for February 2018, the next version (1.3) of the TLS
protocol is being standardized. The standardization pro-
cess is not finished and as we have learned from other
server-side protocol upgrades [34], we should not expect
a quick upgrade to TLS 1.3 (especially, as the TLS 1.3
failure rate is high right now [40, 41]). However, with
the current draft [36] the TLS 1.3 protocol introduces the
following changes which might affect PADVA:
1. removed the ServerKeyExchange message type,
2. removed the GMT timestamp fields from the client
and server random structures.
The first change is not disruptive, as the new
CertificateVerify message with similar semantics
was introduced instead. The CertificateVerify mes-
sage contains a signature that is computed over the
client’s and server’s random inputs, thus it can be used
to prove that a given key was used for signing (exactly as
with the ServerKeyExchange message).
The latter change was introduced to prevent finger-
printing, as a GMT timestamp could be used to track
clients and servers (note, that the most of the handshake
messages are exchanged in the plaintext, thus an eaves-
dropping adversary can read them) [27]. Due to this
change, it is impossible to prove when a given key was
used (as there is no timestamp). If this change reminds
stable in the specification, it will break relying upon pro-
tocols (like TLSdate13) and will partially affect PADVA
as well. Namely, the simple version (the version with-
out external timestamping presented in subsection 4.2) of
the protocol will become unusable as due to this change
notaries would not be able to prove when a given key
was used. Fortunately, PADVA can still be deployed in
the scenario with an external time source (see subsec-
tion 4.3). Moreover, if the monitored server deploys TLS
1.3, then any server with a lower TLS version (e.g., TLS
1.2) can act as a time source. Furthermore, as described
in subsection 7.1 other services can be used for providing
reference timestamps.
7.3 Blockchain Time
A public blockchain is an open distributed infrastruc-
ture, and nodes do not have precisely synchronized
clocks [43]. However, by definition, the blockchain
structure preserves the order of blocks, and this is why
time in the presented smart contracts (i.e., time() calls)
12https://roughtime.googlesource.com/roughtime
13https://github.com/ioerror/tlsdate
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can be expressed in numbers of blocks and not in sec-
onds (usually, blockchain platforms are configured such
that new blocks arrive in equal intervals). Consequently,
timeouts specified in SLAs can be measured in block
numbers.
The validation interval T is specified by a notary in
seconds. It is a trade-off between security and efficiency,
and although we do not require any minimum/maximum
values for T , there are some underlying constraints and
implications that notaries should take into consideration.
In particular, PADVA has to combine the two notions of
time: a) time maintained by TLS servers or external time
sources, used for conducting validations, and b) time of
the underlying blockchain platform.
In blockchain systems new blocks arrive at intervals
(e.g., approximately 10 minutes in Bitcoin [32], and 15
seconds in Ethereum). Let us denote this interval as TB.
If T < TB, then reporting multiple state changes within
TB has some implications as it can occur that many state
changes happen within TB, such the corresponding trans-
actions announcing it will be added in the same block.
Each state change has the associated validation id, thus
as the results, the timeline can be created, however, users
that observe the blockchain get results in batches. With
T ≥ TB this problem is relaxed as usually state changes
will be propagated in separate blocks.
8 Related work
Perspectives [45] was the first comprehensive notary sys-
tem presented. In Perspectives, notaries continuously ob-
serve domain certificates. Clients can contact a notary
server and compare their view of the domain’s key with
the view of the notary. Convergence [26] is a similar sys-
tem where the main improvements over Perspectives are
related to privacy and performance. Deployment of Con-
vergence was analyzed by Bates et al. [5], where the in-
creased latency of TLS connection establishment (about
108 ms) is reported. Besides that, these systems are cri-
tiqued as they need to have highly available front ends,
they require a significant trust in notaries, and introduce
privacy violations [20, 31].
Certificate Transparency (CT) [22] is a log-based de-
tection scheme. CT aims to introduce transparency to
the CA ecosystem, by making each certificate visible.
To this end, CT introduces publicly verifiable certificate
logs that maintain append-only databases of certificates.
To accept a TLS connection, the client has to obtain
a certificate accompanied by a signed promise from a
log (the promise asserts that certificate was seen by the
log). CT is designed to detect attacks, rather than pre-
vent them. Logs are required for certificate issuance,
thus their front-end servers have to be highly available,
what in practice is challenging [17,18,38]. Although log
servers are auditable, to assure that they do not equivo-
cate (by creating an alternative log’s version) they need
to be monitored by external protocols [9, 33]. PADVA
aims to improve CT ensuring that a given key is actually
being used, moreover, the availability requirement is sig-
nificantly relaxed, and notaries cannot equivocate as long
as the underlying blockchain platform is secure.
CT has inspired other log-based approaches, that im-
prove its efficiency [19, 39], enhance security [4, 19],
and add new features [39, 44]. Unfortunately, some of
these system increase latency of TLS connection estab-
lishment, and other require major changes to the TLS
PKI. As for today, no other log-based system than CT is
widely deployed.
CoSi [42] is a witness framework proposed to keep CA
accountable. In CoSi, a large number of witnesses co-
signs assertions about certificates they have seen. As a
witness scheme, CoSi is focused on detection rather than
prevention, and its design objective (similarly to CT) is
to make attacks visible. It is assumed that an adversary
would not conduct an attack if it would be eventually
visible. In order to achieve efficient co-signatures, CoSi
requires coordination among witnesses.
Researchers already tried to reuse properties of
blockchain to problems existing in PKI. For instance,
Namecoin [25] (the first fork of Bitcoin) provides a
namespace where names can be associated with pub-
lic keys. Certcoin [14] improves Namecoin’s ineffi-
ciency and supplements the original scheme by features
like key revocation and recovery. Bonneau proposed
EthIKS [8] to improve auditability of the CONIKS sys-
tem [30], while Matsumoto and Reischuk [28] introduce
a blockchain-based system that provides financial incen-
tives for detecting fraudulent certificates.
9 Conclusions
In this paper, we presented PADVA, the next generation
TLS notary system. PADVA provides many features and
properties that the previous notary system could not pro-
vide. By leveraging the TLS specification and redesign-
ing the validation process, notaries in PADVA do not
have to be trusted as much as they were in the past. No-
taries become auditable and accountable, able to moni-
tor desynchronized servers, and ready for TLS 1.3. By
placing a blockchain platform as one of its central ele-
ments, PADVA provides a flexible payment framework
and mechanisms for defining and enforcing service-level
agreements, and relaxes availability requirements mak-
ing the overall system more resilient. The public-key
validation is persistent and implemented as a service.
With the increasing capabilities of blockchain plat-
forms, PADVA could be improved by more sophisticated
smart contracts. For instance, with the current design, a
13
notary can respond via blockchain with any (even incor-
rect) response. Although doing so the notary would ruin
its reputation (as everyone can see it), in the future the
SLA contract could validate the response and act accord-
ingly.
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